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It has been argued that the current scholarship on ethnicity is focused on the rise of 
ethnonationalism, without incorporating the possibility and the nature of decline in its 
scope and intensity. An absolute majority of such movements have indeeded been 
contained in the postwar era. There is no reason to believe that this trend will reverse in 
near future. In this context, one can point to Pakistan, Baloch and Sindhi nationalist 
movements within Pakistan. Our discussion of the rise of the mohajir movement in this 
paper provides clear indicators of the potential determinants of its decline. 
It is significant that it is the state at the non-policy level which created a situation of 
ethnic explosion in urban Sindh. Various macro-level explosive issues revolving around 
conflicts between politicians and army, federalist and provincial forces, Islamist and 
secularist elements and, externally, India and Pakistan seriously circumscribed the state’s 
capacity and will to persue micro-level issues such as urban planning educational and 
manpower strategies, rural-urban and inter provincial migration and investment in mental 
infrastructure in general. The abdication of policy by the state rendered it inactive and 
irrelevent. This ‘residual’ state was represented by officials at the bottom level who 
controlled a vast number of transactional activities outside the purview of law. 
Ethnicity emerged as the new source of definition and categorisation of interests 
and identity formation as the state defaulted on various counts such as citizen 
orientations, legal protection and security of life and property. In other words, it was not 
too much of the (Jacobin) state, as primordialists would have us believe, but rather too 
little of it which produced the mohajir ethnic consciousness. We can maintain that the 
process of nativisation of mohajir is the product of multiple locational and transactional 
activities which do not necessarily reflect state policies. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A large number of countries in the contemporary world have experienced 
ethnic revival in recent times. Ethnolinguistic communities which lived within the 
framework of so-called nation-states have started asserting themselves in search of a 
separate political identity, devolution of power and even independence. 
Ethnonationalist movements have taken different forms ranging from holding of 
referendums for determining the issue of devolution or independence to resorting to 
armed struggles. The process of decolonisation left issues of delimiting proper 
frontiers between new states or determining the fate of migrant populations living 
outside their homelands unresolved. This led to irridentist claims of certain countries 
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to parts of the territory of neighbouring states and to their support for ethnic 
movements.  
Mohajir nationalism represents a paradox in the context of ethnic conflict. 
Unlike Bengali, Sindhi, Pakhtun and Baloch nationalist movements which 
represented relatively well-defined historical communities identified with their 
respective geographical units, the mohajir ethnicity is still passing through its birth 
pangs. In other words, the task of analysing the mohajir ethnic movement 
simultaneously involves the study of ethnicity-in-making.  In this paper, we plan to 
focus on the way the mohajir community came to itself as an entity separate from the 
host society. Secondly, the clue to mohajir nationalism lies in the fact that this 
migrant community has launched a ‘sons of the soil’ movement of its own. We shall 
analyse this movement in terms of transformation of a migrant community into a 
self-conscious native community seeking to carve out a political space for itself.  
The debate about ethnicity relates to a choice between the latent sources of 
ethnic identity and their manipulation by ethnonationalists as the determining 
variable. Many researchers have focused on primordial loyalties being at the heart of 
the ethnic revival of our times. These loyalties are either defined in terms of blood 
ties of tribe, family and kin or understood as social and cultural ‘givens’ such as 
custom, language, religion and descent.1 In this framework, the unique (common) 
origin, history,  cultural individuality and a sense of collective solidarity emerge as 
the leading primordial features of an ethnic community.2 Primordialists have been 
generally criticised for focusing on historical and mythical symbols without fully 
bringing out the political uses of these symbols by ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’. As 
opposed to primordialists, instrumentalists or circumstantialists consider ethnic ties 
to be socially and culturally constructed.3 For example, Brass argues that ethnicity is 
not a given; instead it is a social and political construction. Elites who are in 
competition for resources ‘draw upon, distort and sometimes fabricate materials from 
the cultures of the groups’ for collective and individual advantages.4 Secondly, the 
activities of the modern centralised state play a pivotal role in pushing the elites of 
the non-dominant groups to ethnic nationalism.5 The process of selection and 
manipulation of symbols in order to define ethnic boundaries serves the crucial 
function of identity formation as the basis for political mobilization.6 State policies 
and elite competition, then, emerge as central variables in Brass’ theory of ethnic 
nationalism. 
1Edward Shils, ‘Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties’, British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 8, 
No. 2, p. 142, and Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 1973, p. 259. 
2Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival, Cambridge, 1981, p. 10. 
3J. D. Eller and R. M. Coughlan, ‘The Poverty of Primordialism: The Demystification of  Ethnic 
Attachments’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol.16, No. 2, April 1993, pp.194–97. 
4Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, Sage: New Delhi, 1991, p. 8. 
5Ibid. pp. 8-9. 
6Ibid. p. 101. 
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Competition between ethnic groups can also take place when one of them 
happens to be migrant, either directly or by descent. Weiner has discussed ethnic 
movements in India against the perceived dominance of migrants from elsewhere in 
the country in terms of nativist sentiments. These movements tend to project territory 
as a source of legitimacy for demanding jobs for  locals and constructing a culturally 
distinct identity.7 Rapid growth of education in the lower middle class among locals 
creates a demand for jobs which are already in the hands of the migrant middle class. 
That creates a nativist reaction couched in a middle class sentiment.8 When state 
governments make preferential policies in favour of locals, it serves the political 
purpose of gaining their support while the cost of alienating migrant minorities is 
considered politically bearable.9  
Mohajirs migrated to Pakistan in 1947 from different geographical regions, 
linguistic groups and ethnic communities of India. As such, the primordialist position 
that ethnicity is a product of common history, language, territory and tradition does 
not explain the mohajir movement. As for the instrumentalist approach, it focuses on 
the activist dimensions of an ethnic movement including its organisational profile, 
strategy of mass mobilisation and political agenda. However, the two core variables 
of the instrumentalist approach, i.e., elite competition and state policies are 
problematic in this context. First, the MQM’s movement is typically non-elite. Most 
of the MQM’s party ideologues, campaign organisers, and militant activists belong 
to lower middle class. Secondly, the centrality of the state policies for explaining the 
mohajir phenomenon has to be considered with great caution, especially as some 
analysts have actually applied this model to previous ethnic movements in 
Pakistan.10 In a typical third world country, state’s policies do not incorporate large 
sectors of public and private activity where patterns of interaction at the local level 
create new interpersonal, inter-sectoral and inter-ethnic conflicts. In the case of 
mohajir nationalism, a whole series of changes ranging from regional developments 
such as the Afghanistan war to indigenous revival in Punjab and Sindh defy an 
explanatory model based on state policies.11 
 
MAKING OF THE MOHAJIR COMMUNITY 
Mohajirs constitute a part of the population which migrated from India to 
Pakistan after partition in 1947. A majority of migrants came from East Punjab and 
7Myron Weiner, Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India, Princeton, 1978, pp. 24, 
113–120, 180-81, 228-29, 237. 
8Ibid. pp. 285–93. 
9Myron Weiner and Mary F. Katzenstein, India’s Preferential Policies: Migrants, the Middle 
Classes, and Ethnic Equality, Chicago, 1981, p. 130. 
10See Tahir Amin, Ethnonational Movements of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1988, pp. 8-9.  
11For application of Brass’s state-centred model, see ibid. pp. 223, 254–55. 
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settled in West Punjab. They got relatively assimilated with the native population 
within a generation. On the other hand, mohajirs came from areas further east, south 
and west in India and settled mainly in urban Sindh. They remained largely 
unassimilated with the local population even after two generations.    
 
Patterns of Migration 
 Number of  Share of  Ratio in Total 
 Refugees Refugees Population 
1.  Pakistan 7.22 million 100  10% 
2.  East Bengal .7 million 9.67% 1.7% 
3.  W. Pakistan 6.52 million 90.3% 20% 
4.  Punjab 5.3 million 73% 25.6% 
5.  Sindh (ex K)  .55 million 7.6% 11.7% 
6.  Karachi  .61 million 8.53% 55% 
Source: Census of Pakistan 1951, Vol. I, Table 19-A, Vol. 6, p. 65. 
 
Unlike in Punjab, refugees in Sindh defied integration in the local society 
because of their linguistic, cultural and historical remoteness from Sindhis. These 
differences were patterned along sectoral lines. 63.9 percent of refugees in Sindh 
lived in urban areas, 86.16 percent in Hyderabad district and 71 percent in Sakhar.12 
In Karachi, there were only 14.28 percent speakers of Sindhi in 1951 as opposed to 
58.7 percent who spoke Urdu as their mother tongue.13 Thus, Karachi overnight 
became a mohajir city. The government of Pakistan carved the city out of Sindh in 
July 1948. It became a federally administered area as capital of Pakistan. 
The process of refugee rehabilitation in Karachi and Sindh generally remained 
far from satisfactory. Even in 1954, i.e. 7 years after partition, no less than 2,40,000 
out of a total of 7,50,000 refugees in Karachi were still to be rehabilitated.14 While in 
Punjab, immigration had virtually stopped in 1948, in Sindh it continued even after 
the passport and visa system was introduced for travel between India and Pakistan. 
About 1,00,000 refugees from India continued to come to Pakistan each year, with a 
majority belonging to ‘urban classes’ who generally came straight to Karachi. This 
created an immense problem of settlement, which in turn led to gross frustration 
among refugees.   
12Census of Pakistan, Karachi, 1951, Vol. 6, Statement 3-R, p. 36. 
13Ibid. Vol. 1, Statement 5-C, p. 87. 
14Debates (CAP), 23 March 1954, p. 405. 
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Mohajirs constitute a privileged community on the decline. Initially, they 
dominated the All India Muslim League in British India and later the government in 
Pakistan.15 However, they occupied an inherently insecure position in terms of 
electoral politics. Prime Minister-designate Liaqat Ali Khan who was a mohajir was 
inducted into the Constituent Assembly in place of an elected member from East 
Bengal. The mohajir leadership chose to bypass the Constituent Assembly which had 
been elected by the Muslim members of the legislative assemblies of Muslim 
majority provinces comprising Pakistan, and which was therefore dominated by 
‘locals.’ It shunned elections which would  lead to its exit from power. Instead, it 
operated through the higher bureaucracy which was also dominated by migrants of 
both Punjabi and mohajir extraction. Mohajirs who were only 3 percent of the 
population had 21 percent jobs.16 Among senior jobs, mohajirs had 33.5 percent in 
federal bureaucracy in 1973 and 20 percent in the Secretariat group in 1974; 
however, their share came down to 18.3 percent in 1986 and 14.3 percent in 1989 
respectively.17 
Mohajirs not only dominated politics and bureaucracy but also business. The 
Gujrati-speaking migrants from Bombay in India, especially Memon, Bohra and 
Khoja communities, were in the vanguard of industrialisation in Pakistan. Gujrati-
speaking mohajirs controlled seven of the twelve largest industrial houses.18 In 1972, 
when Bhutto nationalised industry in the ten leading sectors including electrical 
engineering, petrochemicals, iron and steel as well as rudimentary automotive 
assembly plants, mohajirs were dealt a severe blow.    
The mohajir-led political leadership in the immediate postindependence 
period sought to identify Pakistan with the Islamic world. Political loyalties in 
Pakistan were thus ‘externalised’ in the name of religion.19 Mohajirs also continued 
to be deeply involved in the fate of Indian Muslims across the border. They were 
acutely sensitive to the latter’s needs to get jobs and tried to help them migrate to 
Pakistan. Indeed, mohajirs interpreted the Two Nation Theory itself in the context of 
the right of Indian Muslims to migrate to Pakistan. This led to a general deification 
of the state, accompanied by a cult of unity of the nation in the face of the perceived 
Indian bellicosity, largely at the cost of provincial autonomy, indigenous cultures and 
15Both the first Governor general and the first prime minister of Pakistan were mohajirs. 
Similarly, the Central Working Committee of the Muslim League was also dominated by  mohajirs. 
16For a detailed discussion, see Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan, 
Islamabad, 1994, p. 109; also Table 4, p. 108. 
17Charles H. Kennedy, ‘Managing Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Pakistan’, Regional Politics and 
Policy, Vol. 3, Spring 1993, No. 1, pp. 138-9. 
18Hanna Papanek, ‘Pakistan’s Big Businessmen’, Economic Development and Cultural  Change, 
21, 1972, pp. 25.  
19Hamza Alavi, ‘Nationhood and Communal Violence in Pakistan’, Journal of Contemporary 
Asia,  Vol. 21, No. 2, 1991, p. 154. 
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local languages.20 Mohajirs’ political attitudes were typically based on a paternalistic 
vision of the society, enhanced commitment to ideological mobilisation and lack of 
tolerance for provincial and ethnic aspirations.   
Three broad areas of change adversely affected mohajirs: first, One-Unit was 
conceived to counter the weight of Bengalis in the National Assembly of Pakistan in 
view of the latter’s share of 55 percent in the country’s population. However, under 
One Unit, it was Punjabis not mohajirs who expanded their job circuit. Secondly, the 
1958 coup put Punjabi generals in control of key positions in the corporate sector, 
opening up jobs for their co-ethnics. Finally, the shift of capital to Islamabad in the 
vicinity of the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi pointed to the centrality of 
Punjab-based army in the new dispensation, largely at the expense of mohajirs.  
Pakistan was a state infused with a dominant migrant ethos, couched in an 
ideological framework of the Two-Nation Theory as the raison d’ etre of Pakistan. 
The ruling elite took pride in the achievements of the Indo-Muslim civilisation over a 
thousand years and appropriated its symbols such as Urdu language, Moghul 
architectural monuments and the Indo-Iranian tradition of art. The 1970 election was 
to change all that. The elite was unable to take into account the massive currents of 
indigenous revival in East Bengal, Punjab and Sindh. In (W) Pakistan, the Indus 
Valley overtook the Indo-Muslim civilisation as a source of cultural symbols. 
Territorial nationalism pushed aside ideological nationalism as the dominant mode of 
thinking. The popular refrain in the 1970s was that Pakistan was the home of four 
cultures, Sindhi, Punjabi, Baloch and Pakhtun. This gradually legitimised the thesis 
that Pakistan consisted of four nationalities. The new populism flourished at the cost 
of the cherished worldview of the migrant elite rooted in a unitarian model of 
politics. In 1970, the state of Pakistan which was originally conceived in non-
Pakistan areas finally took roots in the languages and cultures of the country itself.  
The indigenous revival put a new generation of Sindhi leadership in power. It 
represented popular aspirations identified with historical and cultural identity of 
Sindh and was committed to the goal of cultural preservation against the perceived 
onslaught of mohajirs. It criticised the fact that only one fourth of the material in 
school text books reflected indigenous Pakistani cultures and their heroes while three 
fourths represented northern Indian cultural symbols  and that making of Pakistan 
was attributed predominantly to Muslims of minority provinces while the role of 
majority provinces, especially Sindh which voted for Pakistan before others, was 
ignored.21  
The land question was another major source of Sindhi nationalist sentiment. 
Out of the land brought under cultivation by Ghulam Mohammad, Guddu and Sakhar 
20For a discussion of the migrant ethos, see Mohammad Waseem, op. cit., pp. 110-11.
21Aftab Kazi, ‘Ethnic Nationalities, Education and Problems of National Integration in Pakistan-
II’, Sindh Quarterly, 1989, No.1, pp. 21–27. 
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Barrages, 1.48 million, 0.64 million and 0.28 million acres respectively, ex-military 
officers and bureaucrats among others—mostly Punjabi but also mohajirs—were 
allotted .87 million, 0.32 million and 0.13 million acres in that order.22 The standard 
mohajir response to Sindhis’ protest was that Sindhi waderas were too much given to 
a life of luxury and Sindhi haris were far too condemned to a life of misery to 
cultivate lands irrigated by Sukhar Barrage and that mohajir domination in education 
and services was the product of inability or unwillingness of Sindhis to fill the 
vacuum created by the departing Hindus.23 Mohajirs favoured an open system of 
recruitment to educational institutions, jobs and businesses through competition on 
the basis of merit. Sindhis wanted protection through a fixed quota for jobs and 
services.  
 
NATIVISATION OF A MIGRANT COMMUNITY 
During the second quarter century after independence, mohajirs’ social vision 
was effectively ‘nativised’. They now looked at themselves as belonging to Sindh 
and, especially, Karachi. This happened due to arrival of new migrants who 
challenged their cultural, economic and political interests. During the last half 
century, Karachi experienced four major waves of migration, comprising mohajirs 
(1940s–50s), Punjabis and Pathans (1960s–80s), Sindhis (1970s–90s), and foreigners 
including Afghans, Iranians, Iraqis, Ethiopians, Sri Lankans, Bangladeshis, Burmese, 
Thais and Philipinos among others (1980s–90s).  
The mohajir mass public which represented the bulk of the first wave migrants 
squatted in kachi abadis in conditions of acute residential and income insecurity. 
This situation reflected their helplessness with the local government for provision of 
tenure and civic amenities.24 During the 1980s, the popular idiom shifted away from 
the two traditional sources of mohajir identity formation, Islam and Pakistan.25  
The second wave of migrants representing Punjabis and Pathans has been 
defined as ‘circular migration’ as opposed to the ‘permanent migration’ of mohajirs. 
The former kept relations with family back home and visited home at varying 
intervals. It was estimated that out of 350,000 new inhabitants of Karachi every year, 
150,000 were migrants from upcountry.26 Punjabi migrants entered jobs in the new 
industrial units. They were followed by Pathan construction workers, diggers of soil, 
22Abbas Rashid and Farida Shaheed, Pakistan: Ethno-Politics and Contending Elites. UNESCO 
Discussion Paper 45, 1993, p. 16. 
23Jang, 31 October 1987. 
24Peter Nientied, ‘Usmania Mohajir Colony in 1973 and 1983’, in Jan Van der Linden and Frits 
Selier (eds), Karachi: Migrants, Housing and Housing Policy.  Vanguard, Lahore, 1991, p.  138. 
25Feroz Ahmed, ‘The Rise of Mohajir Separatism in Pakistan’, Pakistan Progressive. Wisconsin 
Osh Kosh, Summer/Fall 1989, Vol. 10, No. 2/3, p. 39. 
26Frits Selier, ‘Family and Rural-Urban Migration in Pakistan’, in Jan Van der Linden and Frits 
Selier (eds), op. cit., p. 5. 
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retail sellers and transport workers. At least half of them behaved as working-life 
migrants tied with home.27 Unlike the first wave migrants, the second wave migrants 
tended to keep their upcountry identity and loyalty intact.  
 
Linguistic Groups in Karachi 
Urdu Punjabi Pushto  Sindhi Balochi Hindko Others 
54.3% 13.6% 8.7% 6.3% 4.4% 1% 11.7% 
Source: 1981 Census Report of Karachi Division. Islamabad, 1984, p. 10. 
 
In Karachi, ethnicity emerged as the dominant theme in the 1980s as the mass 
of humanity living off the mainstream ‘planned’ social and political life developed 
its own rules of game for survival. Ethnic groups were huddled together into 
informal security structures woven around vested interests such as jobs, houses, 
security against eviction or bulldozing of illegal tenements and other psychological 
support mechanisms. Mohajirs started developing a sense of nationalism about 
Karachi and Sindh as a bulwark against Punjabi and Pathan migrants. Previously, 
Punjabis had joined hands with mohajirs and Pathans to form the Mohajir-Punjabi-
Pakhtun Muttahida Mohaz which sought to safeguard the rights of the three migrant 
communities in Sindh. However, as mohajirs sought to co-operate with Sindhis 
against Punjabis, the latter reacted by closing their gap with Sindhis. 
The third wave of migration brought Sindhis into Karachi and Hyderabad. Re-
integration of Karachi with Sindh in an administrative and ‘political’ sense in 1970 
and installation of a PPP government led by nationalist elements under Mumtaz Ali 
Bhutto as well as acts such as passing of the Language Bill and introduction of the 
quota system made the presence of Sindhis felt in the city.  The quota system 
provided jobs for the nascent Sindhi middle class. Moreover, the late arrival of Green 
Revolution in Sindh in the 1980s displaced many Sindhi tenants and haris from land 
and pushed them to Karachi.28  
The fourth wave of migration emerged in the 1980s when nationals of the 
neighbouring countries started coming to Karachi. A huge market in manpower 
transport emerged in the east of Arabian Sea extending to India, Sri Lanka, 
Bangladesh, Burma, Indonesia and Philippines up to South Korea. Karachi became 
an important mid-way stop on the route to the Gulf, often becoming the hub of 
underground activity surrounding traffic in workers, drug and women from 
Bangladesh and Philippines. The number of political refugees from Afghanistan, Iraq 
(Kurds), Iran (Bahais), Burma (Muslims), and Sri Lanka (Tamils) and economic  
 
27Ibid. pp. 25–27. 
28S. Akbar Zaidi, ‘Sindhi vs Mohajir in Pakistan: Contradiction, Conflict, Compromise’, 
Economic and Political Weekly. May 16, 1991,  p. 1297. 
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refugees from Philippines, Bangladesh, Thailand, Somalia and Ethiopia in 1995 rose 
to 1,626,324.29  
The first wave migrants—mohajirs—resent the second, third and fourth wave 
migrants, and now consider themselves ‘natives’ of Karachi and Sindh. They view 
Punjabis and Pathans as migrants of fortune who earn in Karachi but send back their 
earnings to their families upcountry, and invest money there in property and 
education of children, involving a net transfer of resources from Karachi. Mohajirs 
also object to the Sindhis’ practices of earning in Karachi and spending in the 
interior. 
 
MQM: A POLITICAL PROFILE 
Squatter settlements provided a fertile ground for the ethnic message of 
mohajir student activists. Universities and colleges crystallised mohajir 
consciousness. Mohajir students had to contend with student associations organised 
on linguistic and regional lines, including the Punjab Students Association, Pakhtun 
Students Association, Baloch Students Organisation and Jiye Sindh Students 
Federation. This led to formation of the All Pakistan Mohajir Students Organisation 
(APMSO) in 1978. APMSO was a product of the perceived mohajir grievances in 
terms of non-delivery of promises of the PNA leaders to eliminate the quota system 
and to secure the lives of mohajirs against the perceived tyranny and violence. These 
student leaders later formed the MQM in 1984. In the new party, blind faith in the 
leader provided a string binding different participants of the movement.30 The MQM 
created a strong cult of personality of Altaf Hussain.31 
The non-elite character of the MQM leadership gave it a certain level of 
legitimacy to call itself a party of the poor. It claimed that it had broken the spell of 
traditional drawing room politics of capitalists and feudals and brought the poor and 
middle class leadership into assemblies.32 It observed that masses could not vote 
according to their own choice because jagirdars, waderas, sardars and nawabs held 
them down under their cruel and dictatorial system.33 It vowed to establish a system 
in the country under which there would be the rule of not the 2 percent privileged but 
the 98 percent poor and middle class.34 However, despite its progressive rhetoric, the 
MQM lacked any policy structure, reform programme or legislative proposals in the 
29Mohammad Suleman Sheikh, ‘The Issue of Migration in Pakistan’, Unpublished paper, 
Islamabad, 1995, p. 2. 
30Imran Farooq, Imperatives of Discipline and Organisation, (Urdu),  MQM document, Karachi, 
pp. 10–17. 
31Reply Statement of the Government of Pakistan and the Government of Sindh in the Supreme 
Court of Pakistan, 5 June 1995, Petition No. 46/94, pp. 32-33. 
32MQM is the Symbol of Being Oppressed, (Urdu), MQM document, Karachi, 1994, pp. 6, 13. 
33Ibid. p. 14. 
34The Rule of the Poor, (Urdu), MQM document, Karachi, n.d., p. 7. 
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direction of alleviation of poverty. Not surprisingly, the MQM’s self-image as a 
party of the poor lacked credibility in the eyes of non-mohajirs everywhere. In the 
public view, the MQM pitted the poor of one community against the poor of the 
other community across the street, not against the rich from the other side of the 
city.35 The MQM can be considered as a policy-neutral, ideologically agnostic and 
pro-status quo party despite claims to the contrary.  
The quota system has been at the heart of the MQM politics. After the Sindhi-
dominated PPP government took power in Karachi in 1971, the issue of the share of 
Sindhis in education and jobs re-emerged on the political agenda. The MQM points 
to a deliberate policy of discrimination against mohajirs. Similarly, the fate of a 
quarter of a million Biharis in Bangladesh is a constant reference in the MQM’s 
literature. The party has strongly criticised the government of Pakistan for not 
accepting its own citizens back into the country. A closely related issue is population 
because it has implications for jobs and elections. The MQM has claimed that 
mohajirs constituted 60 percent of the population in Sindh and that the 1961, 1972 
and 1981 census figures were manipulated to reduce the population of mohajirs by 
more than half.36  
The MQM defined mohajirs as those who (i) migrated to Pakistan from 
Muslim minority provinces of the sub-continent at the time of the partition, (ii) are 
not considered to belong to any of the nationalities of Pakistan—neither Punjabi, nor 
Sindhi, nor Balochi, nor Pakhtun, and (iii) migrated from those areas of East Punjab 
whose language and culture was not Punjabi.37 The MQM took exception to the fact 
that the four provinces of Pakistan were constantly being declared as four brothers, 
excluding those who did not originally belong to any of these provinces.38 Altaf 
Hussain declared that the slogan of mohajir nationality was indeed the product of 
reaction to the slogan of four nationalities.39 It was claimed that mohajirs had now 
aligned themselves with the destiny of Sindh and become de facto sons of the soil. 
The MQM demanded rationalisation of the prevalent domicile system so that only 
those locals should be issued  domicile who had lived in Sindh along with their 
whole family for at least 20 years. It defined ‘locals’ as those who lived a family life, 
earned, spent, died and got buried in, and linked their interests with, the interests of 
Sindh.40 This was essentially a nativistic idiom rooted in a part of the territory of Sindh. 
The MQM leadership’s hobnobbing with the Sindhi nationalist leadership 
reflected its political stand against the upcountry migrants. The latter formed a new 
35Herald, Karachi, February 1988, p. 58. 
36MQM: Constitutional Petition in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Part 1, Boston, 1994, pp. 4-5. 
37The Journey of Life (Autobiographical account of Altaf Hussain), Jang Publishers, Lahore, p. 
103. 
38We have Raised the Heads of the Poor, op. cit., p. 15. 
39Ibid. p. 38. 
40The Journey of Life, op. cit., pp. 107, 102. 
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party, the Punjabi Pakhtun Ittehad (PPI) on 7 March 1987. However, the PPI never 
really took off.  In the 1988 elections, MQM and PPP bagged almost all mohajir and 
Sindhi seats representing the two ethnic nationalisms respectively. The MQM and 
PPP formed a coalition and signed the Karachi Accord as a basis for co-operation. 
However, soon their distinct party profiles on the issue of implementation of the 
Accord led them apart. The downhill march of the coalition culminated in a secret 
alliance between the IJI opposition and MQM which was disclosed and signed on 24 
October 1989 on the eve of the no-confidence motion against Benazir Bhutto. 
Violence increased on the street and so did army’s involvement in civil 
administration.  
 
MQM: POLITICS OF CONFRONTATION 
The MQM’s partnership in the IJI government from 1990–92 represented the 
high point in its street power whereby it sought to maintain an iron grip on all 
mohajir public activity. The press was a special target of the MQM workers who 
burnt thousands of copies of the daily Dawn and stopped its distribution, looted the 
offices of daily Jang, and attacked the houses of journalists. It demanded full 
coverage of its activities on prominent places on the papers, condemned critical 
views about the party and sought to punish those who would not oblige. As long as 
some sections of the mohajir population stayed outside its fold, the MQM felt that its 
legitimacy as an exclusively mohajir party remained less than total. These people 
were called traitors to the mohajir cause and were sometimes beaten, abducted and 
tortured to teach a lesson to others. Mohajirs were still far from integrated into a 
community because of their different linguistic, geographic and cultural 
backgrounds. In order to bind them together and put them immediately at the front of 
the political stage, unity by command rather than by persuasion was considered to be 
the way out. In 1989-90, the MQM played the local bully for a national level 
political alliance, with a larger political objective of destabilising the PPP 
government. Again in 1994-95, the MQM’s strategy focused on destabilising the 
PPP government by exposing its inability to control street violence.  
The MQM kept the momentum of its street politics high when it was a partner 
in Jam Sadiq Ali’s government in Sindh. Its share in state power, combined with its 
unchallenged street power, produced an inordinately high level of confidence in the 
party workers. Moving beyond the rival ethnic groups and internal dissidents as 
targets of their action, the party workers abducted and tortured a serving army 
officer, Major Kaleem Ahmad. That was the last straw which brought the army into 
play with full force. On 19 June 1992, army started Operation-Clean up in Sindh. It 
claimed that it had got hold of maps of ‘Jinnahpur’ or ‘Urdu Desh’ meant to be 
carved out of Sindh including Karachi, Hyderabad and some coastal area as an 
independent country by the MQM. It also unearthed 22 MQM torture cells, including  
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one in Abbasi Shaheed Hospital.41 Many of the top leaders of the MQM including 
Altaf Hussain were declared proclaimed offenders. Many others, including MNAs 
and MPAs of the MQM went underground. The latter resigned from membership of 
the two assemblies. The army allegedly sponsored a rival faction within the MQM, 
called Haqiqi, comprising opponents of the Altaf group. 
The MQM boycotted the 1993 elections for the National Assembly but it 
participated in the Sindh Assembly elections three days later and won 27 out of 100 
seats. The new Benazir Bhutto government started a dialogue with the MQM, 
especially after the latter voted for the PPP nominee Farooq Leghari as president. 
However, each round of talks ended in failure. In June 1994, Altaf Hussain was 
sentenced by the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Court to a 27 year jail term. In a 
series of open letters addressed to armed services chiefs, Altaf Hussain accused the 
military unit FIT and ‘officials of the armed forces’ in general of perpetrating 
atrocities on mohajirs, extracting bribes from people worth millions of rupees and 
becoming ‘wealthy but devoid of moral fibre and patriotism’.42 In December 1994, 
the civil armed forces took over from the regular army units in Sindh. In the 
aftermath of the army withdrawal, the MQM  launched its major attack on the 
institutions of civil administration and sought to create a law and order situation out 
in the street. In July 1995, a new Operation Clean-up was started in Karachi under 
the supervision of Interior Minister General Babar. It was a co-ordinated effort 
between elite security and intelligence agencies which used sophisticated monitoring 
equipment, network of informers, evaluation and corroboration of information 
acquired through interrogation and intelligence links within the MQM.43 In the 
process of the operation, the PPP government allegedly carried out extrajudicial 
killings, especially in fake police encounters, torture of the MQM’s workers and 
persecution of the latter’s families. The humiliating searches inside households and 
brutish behaviour of the police vis-à-vis the mohajir youth alienated the community 
still further. Not surprisingly, mohajirs continued to look towards the MQM for 
safeguarding their rights and interests. By the second quarter of 1996,  the MQM’s 
movement had been largely contained. While the MQM had intensely lobbied human 
rights organisations in and outside Pakistan, no generalised protest campaign against 
the government’s strong-arm tactics against it emerged in the country. The MQM’s 
failure lay in its inability to challenge the legitimacy of the elected PPP government 
at any stage from 1993–96 either at Karachi or in Islamabad. 
 
CONCLUSION 
It has been argued that the current scholarship on ethnicity is focused on the  
41Reply Statement, op. cit., pp. 161-62. 
42MQM: Constitutional Petition, Part 1, op. cit., pp. 52-86. 
43Azhar Abbas, ‘Future Shocks?’, Herald, March 1996, p. 46b. 
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rise of  ethnonationalism,  without  incorporating  the  possibility  and  the  nature of 
decline in its scope and intensity.44 An absolute majority of such movements have 
indeed been contained in the postwar era. It is unlikely that this trend will reserve in 
near future. In this context, one can point to the Pakhtun, Baloch and Sindhi 
nationalist movements in Pakistan which have been relatively contained within the 
framework of the political system of the country. One can hope that the mohajir 
nationalist movement will be reoriented towards a constitutional form of struggle and 
a parliamentary way to negotiating an ethnic bargain with other communities living 
in Sindh. 
It is significant to note that it is the state at the non-policy level which created 
a situation of ethnic explosion in urban Sindh. Various macro-level issues revolving 
around conflicts between politicians and army, federalist and provincial forces, 
Islamist and secularist elements and, externally, India and Pakistan seriously 
circumscribed the state’s capacity and will to pursue micro-level issues such as urban 
planning, educational and manpower strategies, as well as rural-urban and inter-
provincial migration. What is immediately required is the expansion of the service-
giving network of the state in order to incorporate large sections of the population. 
As the state defaulted on various counts such as citizen orientations, legal protection 
and security of life and property, ethnicity emerged as the new source of definition 
and categorisation of interests and identity formation. In other words, it was not too 
much of the (Jacobin) state, as primordialists would have us believe, but rather too 
little of it which produced the mohajir ethnic movement.  
 
 
 
 
44Tahir Amin, op. cit., p. 256. 
